The question of whether to view psychopathology as categorical or dimensional continues to provoke debate. We review the many facets of this argument. These include the pragmatics of measurement; the needs of clinical practice; our ability to distinguish categories from dimensions empirically; methods of analysis appropriate to each and how they relate; and the potential theoretical biases associated with each approach. We conclude that much of the debate is misconceived in that we do not observe pathology directly; rather, we observe its properties. The same pathology can have some properties that are most easily understood using a dimensional conceptualization while at the same time having other properties that are best understood categorically. We suggest replacing Meehl's analogy involving qualitatively distinct species with an alternative analogy with the "duality" of light, a phenomenon with both wave-and particle-like properties.
For many years a debate has raged over whether (Angold & Fisher, 1999; Shaffer, Fisher, & Lucas, 1999) fall firmly on the side of catechild and adolescent psychopathology should be regarded as consisting of a series of cate-gorical diagnoses based on increasingly complex algorithms. However, for many purposes, gorical phenomena (with individuals being either cases or noncases of various disorders) or questionnaires based on an explicitly dimensional conception of psychopathology, such as dimensions with psychopathology being just their negative extremes (Achenbach, 1966 (Achenbach, , 1985 , as the Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL) and its congeners (e.g., Achenbach, 1991a Achenbach, , 1991c Achenbach, , 1991b Sonuga-Barke, 1998) . At the moment, the official nosologies, Diagnostic and Statis-1992; Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1991; Achenbach & Rescorla, 2000) continue to be very tical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.; DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, widely used in both research and clinical practice. In this paper we revisit this debate 1994); and the International Classification of Diseases (10th ed.; ICD-10); World Health from both theoretical and empirical perspectives and argue that both sides have been fightOrganization [WHO] , 1994) and the research diagnostic interviews that implement them ing under false colors because the questions at issue have been misframed. The central question is not "Is psychopathology scalar or cate-there are categorical states or dimensional lev-Mitchell, Opler, & Rennie, 1962; Wickman, 1928; Young-Masten, 1938; Yourman, 1932) . els of psychopathology toward considering the forms of relationships with other processes, Factor analytic studies began to appear in the 1940s. These formed the basis for what later either epidemiological or clinical. In both research and clinical practice it is these process-emerged as a fairly consistent set of factors resulting from parent-report questionnaires. oriented issues that are usually of primary concern; and the form of these relatinoships, (See Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1978 , for a scholarly summary of the earlier work.) For whether discrete or continuous, does not necessarily correspond to the supposed from of most psychopathology research, "diagnosis,"
insofar as it was considered at all, was defined the psychopathology. For instance, even the most hardened categorialist will accept reduc-in terms of scoring above some percentile on the particular scale employed. Wilson (1993) tions in levels of symptomatology as evidence of treatment efficacy, regardless of whether argued that this dimensional view blurred the distinction between normal and abnormal and, study participants still meet criteria for suffering from the disorder at the end of the study. being associated with a plethora of unsubstantiated theorizing about psychosocial causes of On the other side of the coin, it is hard not to imagine someone espousing a basically con-mental ill-health, contributed to a breakdown of clinical consensus and to the low profestinuous view of aggressive behavior and refusing to acknowledge that it was important to sional status of psychiatry within US medicine. While this is probably laying too much decide categorically whether some individual was or was not a murderer. We will argue that blame for the ills of psychiatry at the door of dimensional models, these approaches certainly most forms of psychopathology (indeed, most forms of pathology of any sort) manifest both led to wildly varying estimates of the prevalence of psychopatholgy in children (Gould et continuous and discontinuous relationships with other phenomena. In coming to these conclu-al., 1981) . However, the factor analytic tradition proved capable of generating some highly sions, we intend to show that at every level, from the design of measures to the analysis of reliable, replicable, and internationally reproducible dimensions of psychopathology (Achendata, continuous and discontinuous functions are inextricably interwoven. To illustrate these bach, Conners, Quay, Verhulst, & Howell, 1989; Achenbach & Edelbrock, 1978 ; Crijpoints, we will use examples drawn mainly from two general population studies of children nen, Achenbach, & Verhulst, 1997) .
By 1980 the basis for the categorical apand adolescents: the Great Smoky Mountains Study and the Virginia proach had been substantially strengthened.
The first major diagnostic general population Twin Study of Adolescent Behavioral Development (VTSABD, Eaves et al., 1993) . study of child and adolescent psychiatric disorders was conducted on the Isle of Wight during the 1960s. Similar methods were then A Brief Summary of the Debate Over used in a second study in an inner city LonScales and Categories to Date don borough and in a follow-up on the Isle of Wight ; GraIn the period following World War II through the 1960s, diagnostic categories for child and ham & Rutter, 1973; Rutter, 1965 Rutter, , 1976 Rutter, Graham, Chadwick, & Yule, 1976 ; Rutter, adolescent psychiatric disorders were defined only in the crudest terms (e.g., American Psy-Tizard, & Whitmore, 1970; Rutter, Yule, Morton, & Bagley, 1975; Rutter, Yule, & Berger, chiatric Association, 1952 and most general population research was conducted 1974; Rutter, Yule, & Quinton, 1974; . Second, Rutter with questionnaire measures of numerous specific behaviors or overall "disturbance" (Cul-and colleagues developed a multiaxial classification scheme that resulted in the WHO len & Boundy, 1966; Cummings, 1944; Gould, Wunsch-Hitzig, & Dohrenwend, 1981 ; Grif-publishing an addendum to the ICD-9 on the classification of child and adolescent psychifiths, 1952; Haggerty, 1925; Lapouse, 1966; Lapouse & Monk, 1958 , 1964 Long, 1941 ; atric disorders (Rutter et al., 1969; Rutter, Shaffer, & Sturge, 1979) . These studies and McFie, 1934; Olson, 1930 ; Srole, Langner, the diagnostic scheme upon which they de-chiatric nosologies like the DSM-IV are firmly based on clinical observation and current repended showed that categorical child psychiatric diagnoses were both feasible and capable search, and are, therefore, empirical. For instance, the substantial changes made in the diof yielding results that were scientifically interesting and valuable for planning purposes. agnostic criteria for oppositional disorder and the anxiety disorders in childhood and adolesThey contributed to the neo-Kraepelinian synthesis that was moving to dominate US psy-cence in DSM-IV were based upon a range of research observations, including field trials chiatry, in which mental illness "consist(s) of a finite number of disease entities, each with set up specifically to examine the effects of a variety of possible changes to the criteria. The a distinct pattern of symptoms and course, and with distinct causes, treatments and neu-point here is not that the resulting changes were necessarily correct, or led to the identifiropathologies" (Kendall, 1991, p. 1) . That domination reached fruition, of course, in the third cation of definitively distinct disorders, but that empirical methods are now equally charedition of the DSM (DSM-III; American Psychiatric Association, 1980). However, in order acteristic of the development of categorical nosologies and dimensional approaches for to cover a full range of child symptomatology, the DSM-III defined a variety of diagnostic cat-developmental psychopathology. Of course, it remains a problem to decide which empirical egories for which there was little available validation (Rutter & Shaffer, 1980) . Despite its approach will best advance understanding of a given question. many limitations, and much trenchant criticism of weaknesses in its scientific underpinnings (see, e.g., Blashfield, 1982) , the basic approach Quantitative versus what? adopted by the DSM has been incorporated into the ICD-10 (Taylor, 1994; WHO, 1993 WHO, , 1994 , In comparing assessment approaches, Achenbach (1985) also contrasts the use of quantitaand now provides the leading paradigm for child and adolescent psychiatric research.
tive measures with categorical diagnoses, going on to explain that by quantitative measures he means checklist scores as opposed to DSM Clarifying Some Rhetorical Terminology diagnoses. While his critique of the lack of definition of items in the DSM-III-R categoWhat is "empirical?" ries has a great deal of merit, the more general undertone identifying science with quantificaIn discussions of the relative merits of DSMtype diagnostic categories and symptom scale-tion is being used implicitly to devalue categorical approaches. Many real quantities are based approaches to psychopathology, the latter are sometimes referred to as being "empirical" genuinely binary or polychotomous and not continuous: for instance, one either dies or or "emprically derived" (see, e.g., Achenbach, 1985) . The implication seems to be that diag-one does not; one is either homozygous or heterozygous (e.g., for phenylketonuria or Huntnostic categories are not empirically derived. Because science is substantially an empirical ingdon disease). The argument should be about which metric is appropriate and whether the enterprise, this is tantamount to suggesting that such categories are unscientific. The Ox-measure used is adequate to the task of placing individuals in proper relation to one anford English Dictionary defines the relevant uses of the term empirical as follows: "Of a other on that metric. physician: that bases his methods of practice on the results of observation and experiment, The Construction of Scales and Categories not on scientific theory; Pertaining to or derived from experience." Note that empirical The role of expert opinion does not exclude but is not restricted to meaning "derived by principal components analysis An often repeated argument in favor of dimensional measurement is that real (numeriwith varimax rotation" (to summarize the basic scale-based approach). The group consen-cally quantified) associations between phenomena are the basis of scale score based syndrome sus methods used to develop current child psy-descriptions, whereas categorical nosologies The point here is not that the dimensional measures we have are defective, but that their are dependent upon expert opinion. There are indeed differences between the dimensional contents are not the result of simply "finding out" the structure of things in the real world. and categorical approaches along these lines, but they are not as extreme as some would have At every level, the things that are "discovered" are defined and constrained by their deus believe. In the development of a symptom scale, only a limited number of items are ever velopers. Moreover, once discovered, they became reified, constraining subsequent thought included in the item pool for analysis. Who chooses these items? The scale developer does, and observation. Of course, exactly the same is true of categorical nosologies. Diagnostic of course, who supposedly deserves the title of "expert." Sometimes the scale developer will interviews tend to focus on measuring only the phenomena mentioned in the current diagpoll others to assist in the definition of scale content, but those others will usually be clini-nostic criteria (and tend to be modified if the criteria change). Thus, the diagnosis, once decians (just as in the case of categorical diagnosis; see, e.g., Achenbach, 1966) .
fined, becomes reified because noncriterial symptomatology is no longer measured. For Expert decisions also enter the process in the analysis stage. A recurring theme in the instance, the ways in which the category of depression has been implemented in the DSM measurement of psychopathology is whether to include or exclude those rare but character-system is inimical to demonstrating possible differences between child and adult manifesistic symptoms of a disorder in the item pool, a decision that is often coupled to the decision tations of depression. On the other hand, the use of clinician and research experts to revisit as to whether the focus is on measurement of clinical or general population samples. With-and refine official diagnostic criteria means that a process is in place to implement warout special adaptation of the instrument, and particularly in general population samples, ranted changes. The fact that clinicians are also involved in these reviews offers a particsuch items can often appear to degrade the measurement performance. As a consequence ular opportunity for refining criteria in the light of extensive clinical experience, without of such preliminary analysis, the initial item pool of the CBCL was winnowed down to ex-the need to wait while new instrumentation is developed. This is far from being a perfect clude items that were rarely reported by parents as being positive. The decision to exclude system, but it has proved quite capable of avoiding ossification. Indeed, a common comsuch items obviously has a bearing on what the final item content of each factor observed plaint is that the American Psychiatric Association changes the DSM criteria too often. will be.
The choice of analytical technique can also have an effect on the content of the dimen-Common measurement practices sions resulting from a dimensional measure. and assumptions The apparent need to reject rare items is commonly exaggerated by the use of ordinary fac-Cairns and Green (1979) outlined a number of assumptions underlying the use of rating tor analysis, a circumstance in which the use of formal item response models is clearly more scales, which, it turns out, also underlie the use of diagnostic criteria. First, consider the appropriate. Many general checklist developers (Conners, 1997; Quay, 1977; Verhulst & DSM-IV diagnosis of oppositional defiant disorder. Eight symptoms are to be considered, Achenbach, 1995) used principal components analysis with varimax rotations to derive fac-and four must be present in order for the diagnosis to be given. The second criterion is "oftor structures to provide internal validation. What would the results have been had they ten argues with adults." It would seem that the clinician (or computer diagnostic algorithm) decided to use maximum likelihood factorization, oblique instead of orthogonal rotations, must make several judgments in order to determine whether this criterion is met: (a) Does different rules for factor retention, or different factor loading criteria to decide which items the child manifest the behavior "arguing with adults?" (b) How often does the child maniwould count toward final factor scores? fest that behavior? (c) Is that frequency great doubt that any two clinicians will agree on exactly what constitutes "intense desire to enough to be called "often?" The second of these questions involves a dimension, and the participate in the stereotypical games and pastimes of the other sex." However, interviewerthird, the imposition of a "cut-point" on that dimension. All the criteria for oppositional based interviews have gone some way toward providing (operational and/or conceptual) defdisorder involve the same basic format. That is, all of them require the diagnostician to initions for interviewers and clinicians in an attempt to improve standardization at the jump back and forth between categorical judgments (such as "does the child argue with symptom level (Angold & Fisher, 1999) .
Third, the informant must be able to exadults-yes or no") and dimensional judgments (such as "how often"). Once all the cri-tract the relevant behaviors or states from the stream of everyday life and determine how ofterion symptoms have been assessed, the number of positives must be counted; if their ten they occur. We would also add that this must be done in relation to the relevant time sum is four or more, then the diagnosis is given. Once again, a dimension (number of frame (e.g., the past 6 months for the CBCL and a variety of frames for DSM-IV diagnoses). symptoms) is being constructed and then reduced to a category by means of a cut-point.
Fourth, the informant or diagnostician must then reduce the information already extracted Now, consider item 3 of the symptom section of the CBCL, "argues a lot." This time it to the appropriate metric for the final coding (e.g., not true, somewhat or sometimes true, is the parent who must make the categorical decision "does my child argue?" Next she must very true, or often true on the CBCL or symptom present/absent for DSM-IV). Different parconsider how often the child argues (dimensional) and then decide whether that is "a lot" ents judge the frequencies necessary to fall into such categories very differently. It is also worth (categorical). The final stage involves a 3-point choice deciding whether the result of the noting that there is very little information about what constitutes normative behavior as far as earlier deliberations should result in a final answer of not true, somewhat or sometimes most symptoms are concerned. Until recently , for instance, there true, or very true. This last involves a shift back into dimensional mode, with the mini-have been, as far as we know, no data on how often oppositional disorder symptoms occur mum number of levels to avoid being a categorical decision. We have been hard put to in the general population. In other words, the decision as to where in the frequency distribucome up with any examples of symptoms that do not involve this sort of back and forth.
tion to set the cut-point for "often argues with adults" has necessarily been left to the vagarSecond, it must be assumed that the informant shares with the diagnostician or scale ies of individual guesswork. It would seem, therefore, that the measurement processes that developer an understanding of exactly which behaviors of the child represent the attribute are used to obtain categorical and dimensional characterisations of psychopathology share rather of interest. However, it is obvious to any clinician that it often requires hard work to find more in common than the proponents of each would have us believe. out what you want to know because nonclinicians do not all use the same psychopathological terms in the same way. It is also obvious Does it Matter? to anyone who teaches clinicians that they do not all share the same definition of every Intervention symptom. Neither the DSM-IV nor any checklist that we know of provides definitions of In certain circumstances, decisions must be made about intervention, and for clinical treatsymptom items. Consider CBCL item 5, "behaves like opposite sex." One can hardly ex-ment these decisions are invariably categorical. For instance, before treating a child with pect that everyone has the same notion of what "behaving like the opposite sex" entails. stimulants, it is necessary to determine whether that child has symptoms of sufficient intensity Exactly the same problem arises with the criteria for DSM-IV gender identity disorder. We to warrant such treatment. The DSM-IV cate-gory of attention-deficit/hyperactivity disor-Communication der (ADHD) defines a group of children who are likely to benefit from such treatment. How-Having an agreed system of measurement is essential for both scientific advance and for ever, it is not the case that someone with a minimal amount of ADHD symptomatology providing a communication bridge between laboratory and clinical settings (Sonugawill benefit from a minimal amount of stimulant medication. Rather, the decision to pre-Barke, 1998). However, the choice between categories or dimensions for psychiatric outscribe stimulants should institute a full trial of stimulants in reasonable doses. It does not comes tends also to influence how risk and protective factors are measured and which spematter for the purposes of our argument how the decision to provide treatment is made. It cific tools for analysis and interpretation are used. Categorical outcomes tend to be associcould be argued that such a decision should be based on the results of a well-known ated with categorical predictors and with methods of analysis like logistic regression and logquestionnaire (such as the Conners scale in the case of ADHD) or even on neuropsycho-linear models that report effects in terms of odds ratios. Dimensional outcomes are comlogical testing, without recourse to the DSM-IV criteria. But whatever assessment method monly associated with dimensional predictors and analyzed using conventional analysis of is used, some cutoff point will have to be used to determine whether to institute treat-variance and regression that report effects in terms of mean differences, sums of squares, ment. Thus, no matter how dimensional the approach used for assessment, at the point at partial correlations, and proportion of explained variance (r 2 ). Although there are notable exwhich a decision to treat or not to treat is made, all the assessment information must be ceptions, to a considerable extent, psychiatry does not have its own training schemes in rereduced to a cateogical statement. It is usual to call the categorical statement a "diag-search methodology. Instead, the traditional contributing disciplines of psychology and epnosis."
This view reflects the clinical perspective. idemiology present independent methodological frameworks for dimensional and for cateWere we to adopt a community health perspective, then interventions need not necessar-gorical outcomes. Moreover, statistical texts traditionally place methods for dimensional ily be targeted at only those currently with the disorder. A dimensional view would suggest and categorical data in different chapters with little or no attempt at integration. As a consethat health benefits can be obtained by reducing a subject's score, wherever they are on the quence, although we may be able to undertake and interpret analyses within each measuredistribution of scores, or that at least a downward shift in the mean would also deliver a ment tradition, how many of us have any feel for how the effects described in one tradition reduction in the prevalence of the pathological upper tail. From such a perspective quite map onto effects described in the other? We suspect our skills and knowledge in this rea different set of interventions become eligible for consideration (Offord, Kraemer, Kaz-spect are very poor. Consider the case in which a psychologidin, Jensen, & Harrington, 1998) , although few of them would involve mass pharmaco-cally trained researcher regresses a normally distributed risk on a normally distributed outtherapy. Of course, community health interventions are also possible for disorders viewed come while our medically trained researcher imposes cut-points on both of these continuas categorical, but these commonly involve targeting effort through the use of screening. ous measures, cross-tabulating the resulting binary risk and binary outcome in order to esThus, the conceptualization and measurement of psychopathology as either dimensional or timate an odds ratio. Figure 1 shows the results of a set of simulations of the relationship categorical may have both intended theoretical implications for and unintended force of of the psychologist's r 2 value to the medic's odds ratio for different choices of cut-point. habit associations with clinical practice and public health policy.
We see that for any one set of cut-points, a sim- ple linear relationship prevails between the There are some particular models and settings in which natural relationships arise. medic's odds ratio and the psychologist's r 2 . For example, setting both cut-points at 1.5 SD Where we have exposure to risk measured on a continuous scale, the case-control methodolidentifies 6.7% as exposed to the risk and 6.7% as exhibiting the outcome, and the esti-ogy leads us to expect that the cases will have a higher mean exposure than controls. Where mated odds ratio turns out to be about 35 times the r 2 value. Unfortunately, different choices the individual exposure measures are normally distributed around their respective group of cut-point for either the risk measure or the outcome measure lead to different linear rela-means and they have a common variance, then there is a little known but the simple retionships. Cut-points of 2 and 2.5 SD identify 2.3 and 0.6% of the continuous distribution to lationship in which the difference in means divided by the within group variance turns out be in the positive category, respectively. Raise the cut-point of either risk exposure or out-to be equal to the log-odds ratio for the effect of the risk measure on outcome (Pickles & come to 2.5 SD (or raise both of them to 2 SD) and the odds ratio becomes about 50 Clayton, 2002) . This equivalence is valuable not only conceptually but also practically for times the r 2 value. Raise both cut-points to 2.5 SD to examine how extreme risk exposure power calculations and more advanced modeling. is related to extreme outcome, and the estimated odds ratio will be more than 80 times
The so-called normal liability model also provides a framework that is helpful for comthe r 2 value of the underlying continuous measures. This figure tells us that to translate municating in the language of both perspectives. As in our simulations above, a categorithe reports of effects from the language of categories to the language of dimensions; al-cal outcome can be viewed as having been obtained by placing a threshold on a potenthough it maybe feasible in simple cases, is not entirely straightforward and is likely to be tially continuously scored outcome. However, in the normal liability model the analysis is difficult for more complex problems. explicitly based on the assumption of the nor- Maddala, 1983) . Outside of this range, translation becomes more difficult. mality (conditional on predictors). This leads to the estimation of effects on the probit scale, This problem of translating from the language of categories to the language of dimenrather than on the logistic (log-odds ratio) scale of traditional epidemiology. The advan-sions is an important one, and it makes productive multidisciplinary research more difficult tage is that, subject to the usual vagaries of sampling error and the correctness of the nor-to achieve. Within research groups it suggests that we should be willing to run parallel analmality and linearity assumptions of the model, the estimated effect of some predictor that we yses where we can. In research dissemination it suggests that, at the very least, we should might obtain from a probit model of the categorical outcome is the same as the regression provide additional pieces of information to enable results to be translated from one percoefficient from a linear regression analysis of the dimensional outcome. It also provides a spective to the other, and we may need to communicate key results in both languages. single framework within which simultaneous analysis of categorical and dimensional out-This would require authors and editors to adopt a more flexible use of journal space (arcomes can be undertaken and for the application of latent variable models to such data ticle text, footnotes, appendices, and supporting web-based material). For methodologists (e.g., Muthén & Muthén, 2001) . It would seem, therefore, that studies could be more it suggests that we should be doing more not only in providing integrated training but also easily compared and understood were we to use and report results from such probit and in conducting more pragmatic research to chart in more detail areas of equivalence and regression based models rather than using logistic regression.
difference and elaborate measures of effect and impact more generally (Kraemer et al., 1999) . Unfortunately, although the probit design offers advantages with respect to comparability for the categorical-dimensional issue, it Metatheoretical considerations has disadvantages when it comes to comparability over sample design. Sample selection Sonuga-Barke (1998) has made much of the metatheoretical implications of adopting a has been crucial to scientific advance in epidemiology, with heavy oversampling of cases categorical or a dimensional approach. He argues that the dimensional view is more open in case-control designs and heavy oversampling of the risk exposed in high-risk designs to environmental explanations of pathology, notably psychosocial explanations. By conbeing key elements of many powerful studies. As a measure of effect, the odds ratio is the trast a categorical view lends itself to within individual explanations, notably neurobiologionly measure that is unaffected by the use of one or other of these designs and gives (within cal explanations. We suspect that this association between measurement approach and type sampling error) the same estimate as if a simple random sample of a general population co-of explanation is just a historical accident resulting from the coincidental timing of interhort had been used. Systematic review across an immense range of studies is therefore pos-est in diagnostic categories and biological psychiatry, on the one hand, and guild issues of sible. By contrast, effect estimates on the probit scale do not share this invariance prop-psychologist versus psychiatrist, on the other.
As far as we are concerned there is nothing erty and will vary with the design of the study. The relative sizes of coefficients (comparing intrinsic to categories or dimensions that predisposes to explanations involving either naone risk to another) and their significance will typically be very similar, whether using either ture or nurture. Nonetheless, we would agree that there are features about categorical or diprobit or logistic, but only for a quite limited range of outcome rate is there a simple rela-mensional measurement that make them more or less suitable for operationalizing particular tionship between the absolute size of the coefficients (the log-odds coefficient being about types of theory.
The categorical view lends itself to explor-3 times the probit estimate within that range, ations of interactions and more fully multivar-factors influencing progress from stage A to stage B, whereas another set is important in iate analyses, such as log-linear models and developments thereof. Those wishing to oper-the progression from stage B to stage C. The manner in which the effects of risk and proationalize interactionist theory (Magnusson, 1988a (Magnusson, , 1988b , have found this much easier tective factors combine to increase or decrease the rate of the final outcome will deto do within a categorical framework, using techniques such as configural frequency anal-pend upon the transitions they impact upon. If the factors operate on the same stage transiysis (von Eye, 1990) . Indeed, in some circles, the dimensional approach has become almost tion, the null expectation is that they represent different "causes" or "pathways" and thus are synonymous with "variable-based analysis," a pejorative term now used by those who prefer likely to have effects that combine in an additive fashion. By contrast, factors that act on a categorical "person-based analysis." However, the source measures for such analyses stage transitions at different points in the sequence can be expected to have effects that need not be categorical but can be made categorical through the use of cluster analysis combine multiplicatively: the effect of the first factor increases the potential pool of sub-(e.g., Bergman, 2001) . Moreover, some variable-based models such as random effects jects available on which the second factor can operate. Thus, how the effects of factors comgrowth-curve models can capture and display some of the key features of the interactionist bine is potentially informative as to the structure of stages. Positing fewer or more stages view, notably individual differences (see Pickles, 1989) ; and structural equation models are also influences the expected age distribution at which the final developmental stage would slowly becoming more elaborate, with mixture models (Muthen & Muthen, 2000) , nonpara-be reached, and even the forms of pathology that we might entertain, for example, suggestmetric discrete class factors (Rabe-Hesketh, Pickles, & Skrondal, 2002) , multiplicative ran-ing forms of pathology consistent with halted, delayed, or premature progression. It is also posdom effects (Pickles et al., 1996 , and interactions and nonlinear effects (Schumacker sible to operationalize stages as latent classes, which are either not directly or only partially & Marcoulides, 1998) now all being possible. Analyses that reflect the interests of interac-observable (Macready & Drayton, 1994) .
In a similar fashion, developmental pathtionists are, therefore, becoming possible in a dimensional framework. However, much re-ways provide a means of linking potentially theoretically distinct steps into a chain of simmains to be done both conceptually and in improving software implementations. ple transitions. Such pathways have considerable intuitive appeal; and, when combined with Categorical and dimensional views also lend themselves to the consideration of rather differ-bifurcating graphical displays, they are capable of conveying valuable information with reent types of developmental mechanisms. For instance, a substantial body of psychological spect to both the absolute and relative impacts of risk factors. In Figure 2 (adapted from Hill theory has regarded development as progression through a series of stages (e.g., Kohlberg, et al., 2001) , the path thicknesses allow a comparison of both the relative and the absolute 1976; Piaget, 1932, on moral development). The supposition of a stage, in fact, provides a frequencies and the co-occurrence of recalled child sexual abuse and neglectful parenting and model with a remarkable range of capacities. First elaborated in the context of cancer de-their association with gaining supportive adult love relationships. The position and angles of velopment these have also been described in the context of developmental psychopathol-the paths shows the individual and joint impacts of the factors on depression during adultogy . A key supposition of such theories is that each stage is qualitatively dis-hood, including the effect modification exhibited by the protective impact of a supportive tinct from the one before and from the one that follows. Stage progression may then pro-adult love relationship being restricted to those experiencing neglectful parenting, not childhood vide an opportunity for developmental changes in etiology, with one set of risk and protective sexual abuse. This simple diagram is thus ca- pable of displaying complex multivariate rela-erally from the scores on a "dimensional" scale?
The often cited bump at the lower end of the tionships linked to clearly articulated theory. We know of no way of constructing a compa-otherwise normal IQ distribution is an indication of the presence of a group of individuals rable diagram where the risks are treated as continuous variables.
with a range of disorders affecting IQ that are rarely found in the rest of the IQ range. A This is not to say that mechanisms cannot be analyzed and displayed using models and number of attempts to detect points of rarity and humps in symptom distributions have methods based on dimensions. However, perhaps unlike physicists, we do not seem to have been made. That these have mostly been unsuccessful is exactly what the statistical thedeveloped our intuitive grasp of such models very far. Formal dynamic models for continu-ory on the monotonic transformation of continuous distributions would have led us to ous variables are typically very much more demanding of mathematics and require graph-expect, because this makes clear that any continuous distribution, however bimodal, can be ical display that can seem substantially more abstract than those described above. If we are mapped into a unimodal one without disturbing the rank order of subjects. Only if we have willing to make wide-ranging linearity assumptions, then path diagrams from the struc-other theory and evidence that justifies the particular level of measurement scale used tural equation modeling tradition can provide highly effective and parsimonious representa-and thus rules out the use of such a transformation can bimodality be used as evidence of tions of complex multivariate problems. However, the difficulties in examining interactions a category. In fact, distributions of symptom counts in both children and adults appear, beand nonlinearities and the lack of highlighting of individual differences are substantial limi-sides the discretization arising from consideration of a finite pool of symptoms, to be resotations of such methods. The language of categories seems to have a simplicity of vocabu-lutely continuous. lary and grammar that is more sympathetic to our developmental theories. However, we should Skewed distributions not allow this to prevent us from continuing to consider alternative models based on di-Can we at least say that pathology is the tail of a skewed rather than a normal distribution? mensions and improving our fluency with the language of continuous variables suitable for The form of any distribution of psychopathology will depend on the way in which psychotheir description. pathology is measured. If one includes items in one's symptom scale that have varying Relevant Forms of Evidence prevalence (one from another) and reflect varyfor Categories or Dimensions ing degrees of normality and abnormality, then it is easy enough to generate a roughly norBimodality mally distributed curve. However, most of what clinicians would regard as being sympCan we tell from the data we collect whether the scientific reality is one of dimensions or toms are simply absent in most people, with the result that general population symptom categories? Some phenomena relevant to psychopathology are self-evidently categorical or scores from interviewer-based interviews and many questionnaire item totals are heavily so nearly so as to be reasonably regarded as being categorical under most circumstances: skewed to the right (i.e., most people have zero or very low scores). Such item total dissex comes to mind as an example. A phenomenon might also be so dramatically bimodally tributions should not be analyzed using standard normal theory regression's but they can distributed that it makes little sense to treat it in any way but categorically, except in studies be analyzed directly by the use of transformations, robust parameter covariance estimation, that concentrate specifically on the rare individuals who fall between the two modes.
or an appropriate choice of generalized linear model based on Poisson, gamma, or inverse Are we able to reveal categories more gen-power distributions. An alternative approach sive" symptoms to look like? The result would be a distribution in which many people had a is to adopt an explicit measurement model in which the items are considered as measuring few symptoms and a few had many symptoms, with no sharp cutoff between the two. some underlying liability or propensity but are also subject to the impact of other factors, Our "real" depressives would be concentrated in the upper tail of the distribution, but beloosely referred to as measurement error. In their seminal work on psychometric scale cause of the imperfections of our questionbased assessment approach, some would be in construction, Lord and Novick (1968) showed that highly skewed item totals are a natural the lower body of the distribution. Thus, even if we were measuring the correct symptoms, consequence of the use of low prevalence items even when the true liability distribution we could expect that our purely categorical disease would be hidden within a continuous is normal. Using antisocial behavior and depression items from the National Longitudinal symptom distribution. Can we recover such "hidden" latent classes? Study of Adolescent Health and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, van den Oord, Eaves et al. (1993) illustrated a modelbased approach to this problem by identifying Pickles, and Waldman (2003) compared the fit of models that assumed normal and skewed latent classes underlying the profiles of item scores over eight different items on antisocial liability distributions. They found little evidence to reject the assumption of a normal lia-behavior from the Rutter A-scale using children from the VTSABD (Eaves et al., 1993) . bility distribution.
Not surprisingly, a model in which all children were assumed to share a single common Latent classes and nonparametric response profile arising from a single liability maximum likelihood class was both implausible and fit badly. Postulating that the population was made up of a Does the foregoing evidence demonstrate that psychopathology is, in fact, continuous and mixture of two classes of children, each with a distinct profile, fit the data much better; but possibly normally distributed? This is not necessarily so. Just because a distribution is con-postulating a mixture of three classes produced a still better fit; these are shown in Figtinuous does not mean that the phenomenon underlying it is not categorical. Suppose for a ure 3. What is striking about the profiles of the three-class solution is that they never cross. moment that there really were a brain disease called depression and you either have it or do The classes are essentially ordered along a single dimension of increased liability that apnot. Suppose also that at some point in the future some aspects of the mechanism of this plies to all items (hence all the represented facets of behavior) and thus probably just redisease will be discovered so that an accurate diagnostic test will be available; but, for now, flects severity. Did this mean there were classes of severity and this was evidence for we have to rely on asking a lot of questions about phenomena that are related to the real the existence of corresponding "real" categorical types of children? disease but also have a range of other causes. Let us also assume that the disease is not very
The answer is "probably not." In numerical computation, a technique called Gaussian common (say it affects 4% of the population) but some of the other causes of individual quadrature is one of the standard methods of representing a normal distribution. In this ap-"depressive" symptoms (e.g., primary sleep disorders, anxiety disorders, bereavement, physi-proach we replace the smoothly varying density over an infinite range of possible values cal illnesses) are as common or more common. Let us also take into account that our by a limited number of spikes at a set of specific values, and each spike is assigned a available questioning techniques are imperfect measures, even at the symptom level. In probability weight. When used as a liability distribution, a few spikes perform like a smooth other words, we face measurement error at both the symptom and diagnostic levels. What normal distribution to a surprising degree of accuracy, although for some problems a lot would we expect the distribution of "depres- of spikes may be necessary. The spikes are, classes, is to let the location and sizes of the spikes be free parameters. Both theoretical mathematically speaking, identical to a set of ordered latent classes with fixed relative loca-and empirical work in statistics (e.g., Laird, 1978; Lindsay, Clogg, & Grego, 1991) has tions and size. If we thought of them as latent classes, then we would be assuming that the shown that the nonparametric estimator of the underlying distribution, essentially the best population was actually made up of classes, one corresponding to each spike. However, fitting distribution, is just such a set of discrete classes of this kind, even when the unwhen we use them in Gaussian quadrature, there is no expectation that individuals "be-derlying distribution is continuous. Thus, even were children actually smoothly distributed long" to one or other of these spikes; rather, we are assuming that the population is actu-over a continuous scale of liability, a representation in terms of a mixture of ordered catally normally and continuously distributed, but we are approximating that distribution by egories would fit the data better than the model in which we used the correct smooth these spikes. Indeed, the expected score (posterior mean) of an individual on the dimen-distribution! Moreover, this maximally fitting latent class representation is achieved with a sion is an average (weighted by the posterior probability of belonging to each spike) of all remarkably small number of categories (often no more than three or four, the number dethe possible spike locations. When we plot the distribution of individual liability estimates pending mainly on the number of items used in the scale or profile). If one tries to fit more that derive from such a model, we obtain a smooth distribution that lies between the two than this number of classes (spikes), then maximum likelihood estimation will indicate extreme spikes.
An intriguing extension of this approach, that extra class as being redundant by either assigning a zero probability weight to one of which corresponds exactly to ordered latent the classes (spikes) or positioning one class in tion of finding three groups: one with earlyonset and persistent disorder, one adolescense the same position as another. One consequence of all this is that results showing an limited group, and one nonantisocial group (Moffitt, 1993) . In practice, however, results ordered set of classes, such as those we have reported so far from the Eaves et al. (1993) have been mixed; it is becoming clear that the specific groupings that are identified are deanalysis, cannot be taken as evidence for the existence of distinct "types" of children, but pendent on the data that are chosen or available for analysis. For example, if the window they may simply be the best way to statistically represent a smooth distribution.
of observation is extended beyond early adulthood, then additional desistance and lateOn postulating a fourth category, Eaves et al. (1993) found that the former third category onset classes can be identified. The approach does provide a sound framework within which was split into two, one of children who stole and one of children who did not. On the face to compare models that impose alternative restrictions on the number or form of classes, of it, this is more convincing evidence of distinct types of children because it is not merely but as in all such tests there is an assumption that the overall class of models being consida distinction in terms of severity. In practice there are reasons to doubt this, too. First, this ered includes one that is correct. Moreover, the approach does not explicitly consider disubtyping may be reflecting not discrete categories but the fact that the children are smooth-mensional alternatives that could yield equally well fitting models, nor that some of the modly distributed over two dimensions, the second now being a stealing dimension. (We know els may be close approximations to a nonparametric maximum likelihood representation, that the argument of the previous paragraph also applies to multidimensional data; see Da-one that we have seen is quite neutral on the category or dimension question. vies & Pickles, 1987 .) Second, the improvement in model fit from three to four latent As we have just seen, among the distinguishing features of trajectories are differences classes, although significant, was modest. Third, classes distinguished by the complete absence in age of onset and desistance. Methods of analysis specific to the timing of events have of one item can result from the use of too small a sample size, and one must be very been developed, in the form of survival and event history models (Allison, 1984;  Cox, cautious about the interpretation of class profile differences under these circumstances. 1972), and differences in age of onset have been used to distinguish qualitatively different Kendler et al. (1998) applied similar methods to adult psychosis, identifying six classes with forms of pathology, as when early onset dementia was linked to APO-E4 (reviewed in somewhat different symptom profiles. Caution is clearly recommended before interpreting Ritchie & Dupuy, 1999) . Event history methods typically presuppose that a categorical such findings as proving a particular taxonomy or even excluding dimensional underpinnings.
phenomenon exists with an onset occurring in a sharply localized period of time. However, much psychopathology is not of this kind.
Trajectories, timing, and events
There may be early-onset prodromal symptoms, or symptom severity may increment Particularly in the area of antisocial behavior, researchers have become enthusiastic about a progressively over time. Whether we can consider a developmental onset as an event may variant of this latent class approach, one in which the classes define developmental tra-depend on our study design. For example, at age 6, very few girls are biologically compejectories and the classification is based on a set of measures over time rather than over a tent to become pregnant, but by age 16 most are. Thus, in a comparison of 6-and 16-yearsingle cross-section (Nagin & Land, 1993) . The data required for such analyses consist of olds, pubertal status has a strongly bimodal distribution and some sort of transitional symptom or behavioral profiles obtained over a series of occasions. Previous work and theo-"event" (i.e., puberty) has apparently occurred.
However, if one were studying just 11-yearretical considerations have led to an expecta-old girls, a wide range of pubertal statuses range of the predictor variable. Without deliberate effort, the routine use of these standard would be observed and this condition might best be regarded as being dimensionally dis-statistical techniques rarely bring such discontinuities to the researcher's attention, but they tributed. When viewed over the longer period, pubertal development could be treated as an may be important indicators of the presence of categorical states. event and its timing analyzed using survival analysis methods. Even when restricted to the An essential feature of the categorical disease entity model (at least as it is impleteenage years, some aspects of pubertal development such as menarche remain more event-mented in the DSM-IV) is that the categories should be associated with functional impairlike, but others, such as breast development are often better approached using growth ment (Wakefield, 1992 (Wakefield, , 1997 . , again using the VTSABD, examined curves. Pickles et al. (1996 Pickles et al. ( , 1998 contrasted these two types of event onset as "hard" and how symptom related impairment increased with the number of symptoms. For conduct "soft"; they showed that, although they seemed to be under the control of a common set of disorder, oppositional defiant disorder, and depression, there was a smooth linear relagenes, when gathered by means of retrospective report, these two types of events suffered tionship. There was no evidence of any discontinuity or jump in impairment associated different forms of measurement error (Huttenlocher, Hedges, & Prochaska, 1988) . Hard with the DSM-III-R symptom cutoffs, or any other plausible symptom cutoff. Impairment events suffered heteroscedastic measurement error (random error that increases with time increased with severity, but disorder per se added nothing more. Had it been found that since the event), but soft events were prone to telescoping (systematic bias in which the symptoms at or above the threshold were associated with a more marked increase in imreported time is moved toward the time at which the report was elicited). Overall, there-pairment than those below the threshold, then could this have been taken as evidence of a fore, interest in timing and age of onset favors the presumption of a categorical phenomenon discrete pathology? Again, the answer is "not necessarily." As with inference from the shape but does not exclude underlying dimensional variation. Nonetheless, the researcher may of the symptom distribution itself, consideration still has to be given to whether a transforneed to remain sensitive to the possibly differing measurement issues that arise with hard mation of the impairment scale was appropriate and whether applying such a transformation and soft events.
would have eliminated the evidence for nonlinearity.
Nonlinearity
Risk to other relatives has also been used as a potential validator of a category. Using If the distribution of the indicators of the pathology alone cannot help, perhaps we should the Twins Early Development Study, Dale et al. (1998) applied the DeFries and Fulker (1985) expand the scope of potential evidence by looking for some sort of validator. What can regression method to assess differential heritability of language problems: whether heritathe relationship of pathology to some other variable tell us about the nature of that pathol-bility increased or decreased as the severity of problems experienced by the proband increased. ogy? Simple linear logistic regressions provide estimates of effects that average across In a general population sample of UK twins, they found that language skills at age 2 were the whole sample ranges of the predictor variables, whereas ordinary correlations and lin-predominantly influenced by environmental factors but that genetic factors appeared to be ear regressions estimate average relationships across the ranges of both the predictors and of greater importance for the most severely delayed. This provided some support for the the outcome variable. It is also the case that a computer statistical package will fit a linear distinctiveness of severe language problems.
However, here, the results of the DeFriesmodel of this sort if asked of it, even if any relationship is shared by only part of the Fulker method can also be quite sensitive to the choice of transformation applied to the Do we see such patterns in real samples? Waller, Putnam, and Carlson (1996) applied phenotypic measure.
the MAXCOV criterion (and other related methods) to data from a case-normal control Maximizing within category association study of dissociative identity disorder and found strong evidence for a categorically disThe previous section hints that the kind of evidence that could be persuasive of the existence tinct pattern of association among a subset of the symptoms of the Dissociative Experiences of categories involves showing that different categories possess distinctive patterns of associ-Scale (Bernstein-Carlson & Putnam, 1986) .
In this application one cannot help feeling, ation (Meehl, 1992) . Meehl (Meehl, 1995; Waller & Meehl, 1998) formalizes this approach however, that the selection of subjects from the extremes that is a consequence of the into the maximum covariance (MAXCOV) criterion. This requires that we consider at least case-normal control design is likely to favor taxon hunters. However, perhaps more importhree variables, say x, y, and z. A priori considerations suggest that one of these, say x, is tantly, we should question the underlying model. First, the expectation of no within catthought to be an indicator of a binary categorical variable rather than a measure of some egory association is an assumption and there would seem to be many circumstances where underlying dimensional score. If correct, then we would expect those in one category to our scientific theory might suggest categories that are distinguished, not by having a comhave lower values and those in the other category to have higher values of x. Moreover, on mon lack of association between y and z, but by them having distinctively different patterns the supposition that categories are internally homogeneous, we would expect that if we con-of association, say, being positively associated in one category and not, or even negasidered each category separately, there would be a rather modest covariance between y and z, tively, associated in the other. For example, in a study of the symptomatology shown by whereas if we took a mix of subjects from both categories, we would observe a more substan-relatives of autistic probands, found that the proportion of affected tial y-z covariance. For example, x could be a symptom score and y and z could be two mea-relatives appeared to increase with the severity of autism shown by the proband, but only sures of risk, say parental neglect and problems with peers. Within the disorder group we might among probands with "useful speech." This raised the possibility that speech was a marker expect both risk factors to be raised, whereas in the normal group we would expect both to for etiologically distinct forms of autism. Second, the categoric nature of x clearly depends be low, resulting in low within group covariances. Only when the groups are mixed do we upon the choice of y and z. What do we conclude if we apply the MAXCOV approach see that the two risk factors covary together.
Meehl formalizes this into a criterion. The with variables x, y, and z and find evidence for categories underlying x, but then apply the y-z covariance is calculated for sets of subjects defined by a range or window of values same approach to x, u, and v and find evidence for x being continuous? of x. This is repeated several times, moving the window across the distribution of x. Plotted (with suitable smoothing) against the mid-Dimensional or Categorical Nature value of each window, the y-z covariance will Versus Dimensional and Categorical oscillate randomly if there is no category un-Properties: Depression in the Great derlying x, but it will increase to a maximum Smoky Mountains Study and then decrease if a category underlies x, the MAXCOV being that obtained from the The question above is resolved when we recognize that we never directly observe our objects window position in which subjects from each category are equally represented. The plot of interest but instead observe their properties.
Different properties do not need to conform to thus allows both the categorical nature and the prevalence of the categories to be identified. a single conceptual model of the pathology. We illustrate this point with data from the Great tween the Tanner stage and the number of depressive symptoms (p = .3). Smoky Mountains Study. We examine first the relationship between puberty and depresHowever, if one divides the Tanner stage into two categories formed by grouping stage sion in girls. We began this line of research in an attempt to clarify the timing and causes 3 or below versus stage 4 and above, the significance of the effect increases (p = .07). of the emergence of the female preponderance of depression observed in adults, and have Taking this analysis a step further, we can examine the outcome variable (depressive sympconcluded that the most potent factor appears to be increasing levels of sex steroid hor-tom count) in a similar way. However, it turns out that the relationship between pubertal mones acting through a mechanism unrelated to effects on secondary sex characteristics stage and symptom count is not uniform across the range of symptom counts. Figure 5 shows Angold & Worthman, 1993) . Here we present that there is no relationship between pubertal stage and the probability of having just one some additional analyses of this topic designed to illustrate some of the analytical is-symptom. All of the effect of puberty on symptoms is carried by those with two or more sues we have discussed thus far.
First, we note that DSM-IV depression and symptoms, odds ratio (OR) = 1.7; 95% confidence interval (CI) 1.2-2.5, p = .008. Thus, it dysthymia symptom counts were "continuously" (but certainly not normally) distrib-turns out that we are dealing with a relationship that is most parsimoniously described as uted, with no obvious points of rarity or bulges in the distribution. As shown in Figure categorical , even though both the predictor and outcome variables were measured on di-4, the count also increased with Tanner stage, but this increase was not linear on the Tanner mensional scales.
It is well known that if a genuinely dimenscale. The counts were very similar at Stages 1, 2, or 3 but higher at stages 4 and 5. If we sional relationship exists between two phenomena, then modeling it as a categorical ignore this and simply fit a linear regression model, we find no significant relationship be-relationship is wasteful of information (and therefore power). Thus, if a continuous rela-cally and dimensionally in relation to different risk factors. tionship exists across the range of two variables, then performing a median split on each and testing the relationship using a 2 × 2 con-Conclusions tingency table will underestimate the size of the relationship. However, it seems to be less It is perhaps unsurprising that psychopathologists continue to debate the issues surrounding appreciated that the same is true if one imposes a continuous metric on a categorical re-the use of categorical and dimensional perspectives. Their workplaces and research cenlationship.
We next turn to examine the relationship ters are dominated by medical doctors, who draw on a long tradition of discrete medical of the count of depressive symptoms to a risk index defined by a summary scale of 26 so-diagnoses and therapeutic interventions, and by psychologists, who are part of a long tradicial, family, and life event risk factors for psychopathology. Here we observe a quite differ-tion of population measurement and continuous scale score construction. It is hard to ement pattern. In this case, we see, in Figure 6 , what looks like a genuinely dimensional rela-phasize just how profound are the consequences of these contrasting perspectives for the cultionship. No cut-point on the predictor risk factor scale or the depression scale produced a tures of these two disciplines.
There is a strong desire for our chosen taxlarger test statistic for the association between these two variables than the linear association onomy to be "right." Meehl approvingly quotes the aphorism from Plato, that we should "cut of the two (means ratio from Poisson regression = 1.14; 95% CI = 1.10-1.19; p < .0001). nature at its joints" and points to the fact that we have gophers and chipmunks but we do What we see is that the "same psychopathology" may apparently behave both categori-not have "gophmunks." We cannot add, mix, and average these qualitatively distinct spe-species, we prefer an analogy with high school theories of the duality of light. When it comes cies as we could were the distinctions between them quantitative. While it should be empha-to understanding refraction, a conception of light as behaving as a continuous wave turns sized that Meehl does not argue that there are not also important dimensions of variation, out to be helpful, whereas particulate behavior is more helpful conceptually for understandthere is nonetheless the sense that, once a qualitative facet has been found, the objects ing reflection and energy transfer. In the same way, to understand depression, we find ciror phenomena are therefore categorical in nature. Before drawing such a conclusion, it is cumstances where it behaves as a dimension and circumstances where it behaves as a more worth noting that species boundaries are by no means so distinct and in the process of evo-discrete phenomenon. Thus, while we accept the absence of gophmunks, we can envisage lution gophmunks might very well appear! After all, the whole notion of evolution first purposes, such as making Brunswick Stew, where we are merely concerned with weight, required acceptance of the mutability of species. More importantly, we believe that the and the difference between a small gopher and a large chipmunk counts for nothing (exspecies analogy places the focus of attention on some abstract state of nature of the object cept among those who believe that only squirrel should appear in Brunswick Stew). The of study, rather than on the properties that it exhibits. It is through these properties that we important issue is not whether depression is categorical or dimensional in any general sense, largely define objects of study, the properties are many and it is they that are also com-but how its relationships with etiological, outcome, and other factors are manifested. If we monly of direct scientific and clinical interest. Crucially, our argument is that these varied are to answer those questions properly, then we need to keep an open mind about the shapes properties need not be consistent with a single state of nature. Rather than the analogy with of the associational curves. In other words, we need to adopt a truly empirical approach that both conceptions simultaneously, exploring analyses and elaborating theories that are not is unblinkered by either categorical or dimensional prejudices. exclusively in one tradition or the other. Third, we should exploit the advantages of each perThere are a number of consequences of holding this view. First, we should strive against spective as and when it is opportune. Those advantages could relate to the ease of operathe metatheoretical implications of a choice that results in us unconsciously selecting whole tionalizing a theory, ease of measurement, ease of analysis, or merely ease of communicating superstructures of thought and practice when we choose to use categories or dimensions. the results. However, in so doing, we need to remain cautious and to avoid both over interSecond, although there may well be circumstances in which one perspective is clearly pretation and implying that alternative conceptions have been empirically excluded, when more parsimonious, these are probably comparatively rare and proving the empirical ad-they have not. Fourth, as methodologists we should also be working to develop a more vantage of one or the other is nontrivial, and may not often be worth the trouble. Thus, we fluid set of tools to assist in analysis and communication in this bilingual world. will typically find that we need to entertain
